Don’t let anyone tell you that the U.S. is only fighting 2 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Indeed, there are “secret” wars being waged as you read this and Obama’s war-front on terrorism is even more expansive than “cowboy” President George Bush’s. We’re fighting in those places but have also attacked people in Somalia, Yemen, and most obviously, Pakistan – and are or have been implied in the so-called “anti-terrorism” efforts in Thailand, Indonesia, and Lebanon to name a few through aid networks (be they monetary, military, or “technical”).
Within the currently shocked and confused framework of international law, we have neither determined the legalistic status of “terrorists” nor have we developed a coherent standard operating procedure (SOP) for their treatment. I believe that our current paradigm of “anti-terrorism” has created a feedback loop so grand in magnitude as to depose our imperialist history to be come the single largest contributing factor to new radicalization processes. We’re directly responsible for seeding, watering, and fertilizing the next generation of anti-American terrorists – and ironically in the name of anti-terrorism and security. The irony of this is only matched by the irony that lies in the fact that the United States was heavily implied in the creation of both al Qaeda and the Taliban in the first place – providing their upstart funding for the sake of the United States’ “security” in the Cold War era, more specifically, during the Reagan administration who provided Pakistan 10x the foreign aid the Carter administration could intellectually condone.
The meat and potatoes of how to check these value systems whose adherents’ sense of justice is so offended by our actions as to be compelled to suicide terror will be the West’s raison d’être for the foreseeable future. What approach to terrorism most effectively decreases it? What combination of war, international development, homeland security, political reconciliation and concession makes us safest?
This question’s answer will prove to be the holy grail of 2010 foreign policy – and quite possibly – will be equally relevant in 2110.
Obama, as I’ve stated before, is not above politics. This strategy is every bit as much about political expediency as it is about accomplishing the stated goals. Insofar as political expediency is a far more constant element than is a stated aim in warfare, politics trumps, by leaps-and-bounds, the initially high-minded and expansive foreign policy rhetoric at which states begin playing the game. Stakes, after all, for solidifying the claims that support jus ad bellum “just war” are valued greater than the actual conduct of a war policy once the effort is bankrupted of public support. In less than 2 minutes, he had already moved into noting that we didn’t ask for this war.
Given his earlier attitude that there wouldn’t even necessarily be addition troops following those added just after his election, this stop-gap effort is more so a design dedicated to saving face, providing a time-frame wherein expectations can be lowered more, and rightfully so, given the Karzai administration’s legitimacy crisis and general lack of policy efficacy, and finally, withdrawal.
Fareed Zakaria noted that he believes the President’s decision smacked of compromise. Insofar as leftists want to leave and the right-wing want escalation (claiming that the stakes are too high [see analysis of Jack Snyder's cumulative gains and losses myth here]) this decision both garners partial support from each side (Senator Lindsey Graham lauded the surge and decried the timetable on CNN, for instance) while reserving for Obama, the ability to claim that he had not been held hostage by partisan politics or public opinion.
2. Politics is (More) Local (Than Afghanistan)
Needless to say, Obama’s ascendancy to the Presidency, like any politician’s coming-to-power, is owed to the broad and diverse swath of citizens who believed their causes would be advanced by their investment of power in him. In wait, to name a few, are environmental, immigration, financial, mortgage, and health care reformists. The pain of a jobless economic recovery with 1 in 10 of America’s workforce disposed of labor, and some part of those, of livelihood has, to some degree, has manifested itself in the . These are powerful interests to say the least.
1. Transient ”Success” Metrics
Von Clausewitz noted that war is politics by other means. Insofar as politics change, so does the conduct of war. Given the Obama administration’s failure to garner the support for this war Americans gave it in 2001, expectations have been deflated by several important orders of magnitude. Some of our initial aims for Afghanistan were to
Build a regional ally through democratization (political). After all, aren’t nearly all politicians, Democrats or Republicans, happily wedded to the Democratic Peace Thesis? John McCain wants to start a League of Democracies to solve world problems. According to this logic, “we” have to stick together against “them” because “we” are fundamentally good and they are fundamentally bad. It’s simply politics to say simultaneously hold these 2 conflicting ideas: that 1. we will and have to “win” for the sake of our security and 2. that our commitment isn’t open-ended nor should our effort be construed to be “a blank check.” Truthfully, in the second or third poorest state on earth wherein the effective conduct of war (by some accounts a civil war between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban) costs several times their GDP. Karzai won’t shape up and seemingly has a disincentive to because 1. corruption ironically keeps him in power in the short-term and 2. America, for sake of security, will probably continue to fund domestic infighting against the Taliban after its withdrawal. Wherein the mechanism to expel corruption is broken, i.e., election fraud was rampant and voter turnout was artificially deflated by threat of the Taliban, in the short-term, Karzai’s removal would take an overthrow by the Taliban and in the long-term, a stronger, more organized civil society than currently exists. There is no lack of a state-of-emergency claims he could make.
Build a viable Afghan economy (economic). We used to have a lot more to say about this while nothing was mentioned of it tonight. In fact, what will undoubtedly be one of Obama’s most cited sound-bites is that the state he is most interested in building is the United States. Another involved something about being a partner and never a patron. I’m calling “bullshit” on this one. Secretary Clinton’s unannounced recent trip to Kabul smacked of an air of teacher-pupil or supervisor-agent condescension and subordination.
Building a viable civil society (social). What the hell is a civilian surge anyway? This was a major hole in the policy announcement. Does this mean we’re flipping more Taliban, helping policy institutions take root, funding proselytization projects against those Obama apologetically said had “defiled” or “distorted” Islam, or building more schools? We don’t know anything but the lack of details and excitement for this aspect over which he thinly glossed cautions us to be pessimistic as worst, minimally optimistic at best – but ultimately aware that some nominal degree of effort outside the military one is being made. We used to make grandiose claims about championing human rights of which womens’ issue played the most scandalous role. This is lost: no mention was made of this effort tonight.
My fundamental logic, in conclusion, that the intractability of the situation in Afghanistan is so dire that it both requires of us help we aren’t good at giving and help we aren’t willing to give (open-ended time, blood, money) this war would be lost. Given that the Afghan plan announced tonight fails to address the underlying causes of Afghan plight, there is little to decelerate their descent into greater chaos upon the withdrawal of American troops beginning July 2011, just 18 months from the date of start of the 30,000 troop surge scheduled for next month, contingent upon “conditions on the ground.” Were the conditions in Iraq, by this metric, promising enough to warrant such a draw-down of combat operations or did we lower the bar enough for those conditions to make the politically expedient choice to pump the brakes? I would say the later given the mayhem that’s ensued since.
Because I think that expansive foreign policy most often fails, I welcome that this is set to end sooner than later. The idealist in me sees how there could have been a happier ending though the realist in me, being stronger doesn’t see how there could have been a successful mobilization of the “stuff” needed to do so. Whether the coming years will make us safer is a contentious debate yet to be had. We’ll have to see all about this civilian surge, what Afghanistan does about Karzai in 5 years, and whether globalization will sink or revitalize the Afghan economy. These elements looking dubious, I think we had better worry about bolstering our efficacy against endogenous security threats.
Political science will never produce a “law.” One thing I’ve proposed, though, is that the world tends toward entropy. This may be the closest the we ever get. A few rungs down the ladder, however, might be the assertion that interventionism ultimately fails.
In an era when our “knowledge” and “wisdom” about the world falls short of translating into meaningful outcomes for international state-building and development efforts, the seeming prescription would be to embark upon as few ambitious projects as possible, if any, given their history of backfiring whereby the results are the complete opposite of the intended effect.
A new, though unoriginal article from the U.K.’s Guardian notes that Karzai ‘would fall in weeks’ if NATO pulls out. WEEKS! We could easily dismiss this claim as David Miliband’s posturing for public support of his American ally. Prone to skepticism, though, we are still more inclined to believe this than we are inclined to dismiss it.
Indeed, this regime already fell when they not only failed to be swept out of office by Afghan voters, but were implicated in widespread, though unsurprising election fraud. In the same way that Americans would have been dismayed at the prospect of a third presidential term of George Bush, the failure of Afghans to sweep away the staleness and incompetence of the Karzai club for iota or semblance of hope is more powerfully disappointing and game-changing than anyone in a high post would be willing to admit. Even given this, it works in our favor insofar as we’ve already determined that we should be leaving. After having allowed the fruit of our earlier 2002/2003 success there to completely decay under the Bush administration’s mismanagement – and finally coming to the realization that it would probably would never be ripe for picking again short of growing an entirely new tree, the lack of a viable partner will aide us in justifying lowered benchmarks and the ultimate withdrawal.
Behind Karzai’s veneer of ‘presidency’ (and the power we associate with state leadership) is a weakness so perverse that any gains would be fleeting at best. Demands of this fight, by all estimates, require several times their GDP in funding. Behind America’s veneer of potential control over the situation there is a social dynamic we don’t understand even remotely well enough to manipulate. The untapped power is that of the Afghan people, miserable and living in too much squalor to be overly ideological about who fixes the situation so long as it improves provides the only real long-term hope. Behind Taliban power rests dynamics which automatically play into their favor ranging from aerial bombardment to the existing cultural skepticism of centralized government and Talibanization which increases at an increasing rate with the passage of time in this conflict.
Putting myself at risk of sounding simplistic, I’ll invoke Vietnam here. Our efforts were largely in vain insofar as our last helicopters departed the embassy under threat of being shot down as we withdrew – losing to the communist scourge. If we indulge in gross over-simplification, it was only through grassroots efforts that Vietnam later democratized.
With our recent success (even withstanding the very recent failure at Fort Hood) at exposing large numbers of domestic terrorists, we seem better served in focusing our resources toward commanding endogenous security factors than attempting to improve domestic security through dangerously ambitious exogenous ventures. Indeed, as we’ve seen, there are significant improvements which can be made to our internal security structures at small fractions of the cost of international war.
Jack Snyder’s prophesy detailing the dangers of over-expansive foreign policy include 3 critical elements that explain some of the most hazardous, though incessantly recurrent elements of intervention. His three most important claims are that
states either mistakenly or purposefully (though falsely) apply the domino theory logic of cumulative gains and losses when attempting to justify war. Losing is such that negative effects, of terrorism or communism for example, will spread to other parts of the region. Likewise, domino theory asserts that gains are regionally contagious and that hard-power operations pay off in multiples because the positive effects spread, too. This is more a device to condone our foreign policy actions than they are recurrent side-effects of foreign policy expansion. Further, non-state actors command a degree of fluidity that makes any gains difficult.
states paint their foes as both “paper tigers” and existential threats. We somehow always tend to convince ourselves that we are able to “nip problems in the bud” in decisive manners though, often in the same breath, we paint these threats as potentially so existentially ominous as to disallow inaction. We are supposedly, dually able to defeat these threats through “shock and awe” campaigns as they are able to obliterate us from the face of earth if we aren’t smart enough to get them first.
states over-expand foreign policy based on the concept of offensive or preventive advantage. Insofar as groups like al-Qaeda generate their ranks based on expansive foreign policy in the Middle East, it goes without saying that the conduct of war, short of the obliteration of their stock recruitment populations is nearly impossible.
In the post-Afghanistan world, though, I’ll be patiently waiting to see how soon it is before we embark upon another ambitious exogenous hard-power venture.
I’m watching this closely and am intentionally withholding analysis. Gordon Brown revealed that Obama’s decision is days away. So far, it looks like I’m right about a few things.
This is an intractable situation. All metrics point a scenarios in which we have abysmal track records (nation-building, development, counter-insurgency).
We lack the volition/ability to address the underlying problems.
We are lowering expectations, refining and narrowing the mission all the time toward something which will be framed as a nominal success, i.e. we are inching toward something that will make us “safer” from al-Qaeda.
Pakistan has begun its own military offensive against the TTP and Afghan Taliban hiding out in Pakistan (and indeed, no shortage of other affiliated militant groups), but they may be laying the groundwork for further radicalization and popular dismay with the war effort.
As Pakistan creeps yet closer toward collapsed statehood, their ratcheted-up efforts are both relatively in line with American demands and a reflection of its loss of control over their state’s right to monopolize the legitimate use of violence. The Holy Qur’an’s mandate to fight has unfortunately been an effective rallying cry for many radical factions. Aerial bombardments thwart the further entrenchment of the more peaceful interpretation of this mandate.
Jihad as the Sixth Pillar of Islam
They may, however, be creating for themselves, a crisis of support in aggressively carrying out aerial bombardment. Though this is one way in which militaries strongly believe that they can reduce the human cost on their side when beginning a ground offensive, the extent to which this may be the case, if at all in these particular instances, may be severely overstated.
The Guardian reported today that a refugee crisis has begun and is mounting. The most recent reports note that upward of a quarter million people will be displaced by the military activities which begun barely two weeks ago. Reports that have been incoming not already 100,000 refugees and also note civilian deaths.
It only seems obvious that these newly minted conditions coupled with the despair which already characterized life in Southern Waziristan will have a further radicalizing effect – effectively establishing a feedback loop whereby counterinsurgency is responsible for creating more insurgency.
We know this because it’s already happening to us. To a degree which cannot be overstated, this is inevitable. It cannot be overstated because tragically, scores, hundreds, or thousands will see their parent, child, friend or neighbor perish accidentally and this has ramifications for ideology and other important factors. It’s inevitable because the TTP, al Qaeda, and others create the situations whereby the civilian toll is maximized to pin the blame on the government force. They then frame it as an affront on Muslims and win droves over people by commanding capitale victimaire. On a local level, they can additionally create an “us” and “them” dichotomy in order to garner support.
Luckily, their particular brands of government, law, and orthopraxie create a lifestyle most Afghans and Pakistanis don’t idealize and have a hard time enjoying.
Given the built-in favorability the government forces have, they shouldn’t squander any iota of it; it’s nearly impossible to regain when lost. Therefore, they cannot find themselves in a situation like the US and Allies are in next door in Afghanistan where critically low ground forces dictate an over-reliance on aerial bombardment. Wisely, the Pentagon has reviewed these practices and has announced that air power will be used as support for ground forces as opposed to a means through which an offensive is carried out. Pakistan would be prudent to follow suit.
The Guardian article took a shot at the numbers game and gave a ratio of 30,000 Pakistani military : 10,000 TTP/al Qaeda et al. They’ll need this many, if not more.
This is an interesting excerpt from said article.
Many gave accounts of indiscriminate shelling and warplane attacks that contrast with the military’s insistence that its forces are taking care to avoid civilian casualties. Kasheed Khan said he carried his 90-year-old mother during a two-day journey out of Makeen, one of the main Taliban hubs. “They were targeting the civilians. I saw it myself. They were hitting vehicles and houses,” he said. “They even demolished the main bus stand in Makeen.” Now, he said, he was staying in a relative’s house along with 50 other people.
“Not a single Taliban has been targeted. It’s only the civilians who have been hit,” said Marjan, a man with a henna-tinged beard from Tiarza Narai. But when he criticised the Taliban another man sidled alongside him and chastised him for speaking against the Taliban, sparking a row that almost came to blows.
Sea of Guns
The most important war of the 21st century will be how “progressive” Muslims will steer the intellectual tradition in a different direction.
The Holy Qur’an directs Muslims to
190. Fight in the cause of Allah those who fight you, but do not transgress limits; for Allah loveth not transgressors.
191. And slay them wherever ye catch them, and turn them out from where they have Turned you out; for tumult and oppression are worse than slaughter; but fight them not at the Sacred Mosque, unless they (first) fight you there; but if they fight you, slay them. Such is the reward of those who suppress faith.
192. But if they cease, Allah is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful.
193. And fight them on until there is no more Tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in Allah. but if they cease, Let there be no hostility except to those who practise oppression.
This prescribes only defensive (and some scholars say preemptive) wars as the Qur’an directs Muslims to only fight “those who fight you.” Every member of the Taliban or al Qaeda can surely cite the ways in which they have been mandated to fight either the Western forces in their states or the Afghan or Pakistani government forces.
Likewise, any “cessation” of fighting is open to interpretation. For al Qaeda, insofar as it seeks to establish a global Islamic Emirate, only world control can ensure an end to their oppression. This is open-ended enough to allow a considerable range of interpretations to condone a considerable range of political and military activities.
These 4 Surahs are as promising as they are troubling. Any enduring sense of justice or peace for the West within the context of Afghanistan or Pakistan can only emanate from the predominance of the gentler of the two brands of Islam which have taken root. Because so many are on the threshold of losing their whole lives in this war (or beyond it), and their worldview, inextricably linked to Allah via the Quar’an and the sunnah (practice) of Muhammad, our actions and those of the Pakistani military, to some extent or another, shape how they will interpret God’s mandate toward or against militant factionalism.
She’s grown 13 pounds heavier, is almost 1.5 times her original length, has 8.5 teeth, can walk, climb stairs, is forming new sounds all the time and has even had that cone head return to normal. If you blink, you might miss something.
A little over a year ago, I was facing the hardest situation I’ve ever faced. I was about to be looking the graveness of fatherhood in the face while still in school and was terrified that I would fall short of meeting all of life’s demands. I saw the statistics which said that too many African Americans dropped out of college before the completion of their degree programs, and though I’ve never considered myself to be at risk of this, it crossed my mind with the baby on the way.
Funny. Not only do I consider myself to be a good father which above all else, I pride myself on most, having never met my own father, I’ve also made the dean’s list more times with Ava around than not. Nitu seems happy and I’ve gotten 2 raises at my job since then.
I don’t really see that Nitu is any worse off having taken 10 months to be at home with Ava full-time. Her comeback’s been remarkable (back to school) and she’s on track to earning high marks this semester.
I’d even argue that Ava’s given her some motivation to really lock down what she wants to study and she seems more solidified in the accounting program than I’ve seen her in journalism, marketing, or real estate. Granted, she’ll finish later – and being in-tune with the gender role constructs pervading both our relationship and this sacrifice (Why didn’t I stay at home and care for Ava ? We never even considered that!) I can’t help but feeling at the least, a slight discomfort about it.
One of us, after all, was going to inherit this job. Yes, I called it a job. (Though getting to shape and know your child is inherently good and one of life’s greatest pleasures, childcare is both important and challenging.)
I can’t help but thinking though, that if I had taken up this mantle, it would have been considered one of the most cunning and abominable heists of the 21st century.
To many, I would have been “getting over” somehow if, for instance, Nitu was the breadwinner and I – the caregiver. I would have been “laying around all day” while she did all the real work. I would be crucified as a shiftless bum not living up to society’s hegemonic masculine “archetype.”
It behooves me, though, to think along these lines. It occurs to me that I am especially because I have a daughter instead of a son but even this is sexist. Really, we should consider the gender implications of everything (like the UN now has a mandate to do).
Sexism, not being the sexiest form of discrimination is dismissed and gender roles are perpetuated by people, who like me, are aware of their problematic-ness but have no idea how to (or even the volition to) change anything.
Interestingly, Ava’s own mother, we speculate, lost her job because she was pregnant, although it would have been impossible to prove, short of getting a wiretap or phone records or something absurd.
It’s everywhere.
Nitu, not I chose that her primary present for her 1st birthday should be a play kitchen. I have no problem with children playing with toy kitchen sets. If we had a son though, I would image this wouldn’t have been his present. (Which raises this issue: many women in my generation didn’t learn how to cook because they either viewed the notion of cooking as antiquated and left it to their parents or were somehow, rebelling against women being “put in their place” and opted-out. Is the loss of critical life skill worthy of this cause?)
I find it both troublesome and ironic how we can simultaneously hold that we are a part of the most “advanced” civilization ever built and quietly hold deer, deeply entrenched, concepts like sexual superiority and subordination, gender roles centered around the construct of a devalued “other” and seemingly not be headed toward any reconciliation.
My life is far from groundbreaking. It does more, in the end, to perpetuate the curse of these ancient human traditions. Given this grim realization, the quantum of solace =) I have lies in the fact that I at least recognize how fucked up it all is.
Don’t get me wrong. It feels like women are more empowered now than ever before, but given the silence that characterizes “background” sexism, it’ll seemingly be a titanic struggle to subvert the power of the penis.
This is dedicated to Ava. If somehow, this exists when she’s old enough to understand it, I hope that the scale of this problem, at the very least, feels smaller for her than it does for me.
According to a NY Times article, General McChrystal
warns in a confidential assessment of the war there that he needs additional troops within the next year or else the conflict “will likely result in failure.”
This move, which in my view, is simply a lowering of expectations, is too little, too late. If this caliber of military brass is just now warning of the prospect of military mission failure, the loss has already occurred. After all, his job, colored by politics, is to put lipstick on this pig to make it look less like a pig.
Grim in my previous analysis, my personal assessment that “all is lost” still holds, even given a “surge.”
Here’s why.
A resurgence of American troops does the following:
results in increased Taliban casualty rates
results in increased civilian casualty rates
results in more American troop casualties (lower rate, higher total number)
results in more Afghan troop casualties (lower rate, higher total number)
wears on the American purse, morale
Talibanizes the citizenry, given higher civilian casualties, war wariness
creates a resurgence of Taliban back into Pakistan (where they’re largely safe)
makes long-term presence less palatable (given resource scarcity, modest gains (at best) and more casualties)
mobilizes political opponents against war effort, which many disagree with currently as it is
After this war has become intolerable, we will set a date and leave after which devolution of the security environment will occur – as we’re seeing in Iraq.
Even given the best scenario progress in training the Afghan force, the political illegitimacy of the Karzai regime will splinter his ability to command the armed forces. Lack of progress in creating strong local governments will also prevent devolution to Taliban influence post-occupation as national resources fall into corruption vacuums and disappear at the federal level.
Expectations for Success in Afghanistan
Afghanistan lacks 2 critical elements that lead to a sense of citizenry/national pride that are crucial to repelling insurgencies.
Their people have neither
a stake – “development” has stalled.
nor
a voice – their government is a sham.
Keep in mind, also, that the Taliban are waging a highly effective propaganda campaign, made more effective by national government scandal (election fraud, drug/corruption involvement, etc).
I sincerely believe that our window-of-opportunity in Afghanistan was when we had successful repelled the Taliban the first time, circa 2002. Since almost every iota of progress made 8 year ago has been effectively repealed, public opinion, a major driving force, has plummeted to our and Afghan chagrin.
When President Bush confused tactical and strategic success and sacrificed the Afghan effort for the Iraqi one, this window effectively closed.
Though I don’t disagree with McChrystal’s assessment that
[w]hile the situation is serious, success is still achievable
in the abstract, I know that we will not muster the Goliath magnitude of resources and commitment necessary to make it happen.
George Mitchell (right) looks pissed, Benjamin Netanyahu (front) looks smugly satisfied.
Later Tuesday, Mitchell sat down with Abbas to gauge his willingness to meet with Netanyahu even without a settlement freeze.
This is as good as an open admission that the freeze isn’t going to happen, and therefore, neither will the talks. Finally, Israel has reached a dead-end insofar as the Obama adminstration is willing to take Iran up on it’s offer to begin holding talks. Israel, however, confronting these realities will continue playing dominantly domestic politics – i.e. – appeasing the majority who oppose capitulation to any degree (on settlements, especially) perpetuating deadlock.
As I’ve said though, even without their help, petro politics would derail Israel’s wish of a even more marginalized Iran because in the end, Japan and France buy their oil (see: Iraeli-Palestinian Conflict and Petro Politics).
Don’t get me wrong. I want to win, too. Not that I know exactly what to do, but we’re getting this all wrong. Here’s to hoping I’m wrong.
Heavy Sacrifice, Few Dividends
Reflecting on the state of current affairs and the 8th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, it strikes me as utterly retarded that the world’s largest and best funded military is bogged down fighting a decentralized rag-tag faction – and doing a poor job at that. After all, this nation’s citizenry overwhelming supported these military efforts which we thought would be – and we indeed were sold on – brief conflicts that would transpire “decisively.”
Although we initially repelled the Afghan Taliban out of the majority of the state following the 2001 invasion with some degree of success, some estimates show that the Taliban either occupy or are a serious threat to up to 40% of Afghan soil today. Though the Afghan citizenry finds Taliban involvement in governance highly unappealing (they implemented the most brutal form of Shari’a law ever known to exist) – are (ironically) becoming increasing Talibanized. As civilians are killed (both inadvertently and purposefully so) the meager means through which any semblance of normal (however destitute) life can ensue are dwindling.
Their new democratic government, designed to be something of a shining city upon a hill is in serious threat of losing every remaining shred of legitimacy with an election scandal spiraling out of control, proven rampant corruption at the highest levels of government, and with laughable resources to accomplish their stated goals for development.
Central, however, to our plight in Afghanistan, the distraction of Iraq aside, is the fact that we’re an advanced democracy wherein politics has had a largely deleterious effect on effective war-waging. Second, the reality of the Afghan plight breeding this ad hoc insurgency – to borrow John Robb’s characterization – requires of us a far graver pass at nation-building than has ever been successfully undertaken or managed by the United States. Finally, the early West’s insistence upon Westphalian statehood has come back to haunt us.
Lethal Dosages of American Politics
As you read this, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen is rolling in reports of the seemingly endless number of ways this war is being lost. Territory loss. Swelling Taliban ranks. Casualty reports. Resource scarcity. Less than sympathetic local populations. Mean Afghan government rhetoric. Plummeting American support. An uneasy president who made a ton of promises who, aside from being the commander-in-chief is also politician-in-chief. The fate of political career, the democratic party, liberal ideals, etc rest on and are inextricably linked to successes and failures and perceptions thereof.
Sadly, within the existing system, none of these factors combined matter as much as the last 2 to Mike Mullen (Territory loss. Swelling Taliban ranks. Casualty reports. Resource scarcity. Less than sympathetic local populations. Mean Afghan government rhetoric. Plummeting American support. An uneasy president). These primarily exogenous factors are impacting the ways in which the war in central Asia, half a world away is being waged – just as history has shown us before.
To the extent that many analysts of American politics saw candidate Obama riding the wave of anti-war sentiment into victory before the economy took a crap, the current mismanagement of this war (if people ever think of anything outside of death panels) would cost the remainder of his balance of (already waning) political capital.
Mike Mullen, aware of this, (especially given recent poll numbers which show the overwhelming majority of Americans ready to get out of Afghanistan,) feels afraid of asking for more troops though the President has expressed an openness to another surge, if necessary. This makes it look (as it really is) that our previous surge has had little to no effect on Afghanistan’s overall security environment. This reflects (or is perceived to) poorly on Adm. Mullen. Though be it an unspoken truth, given their interdependence, his job in this war is as political as the President’s.
All this is in spite of almost every analyst calling this a “doable” war, at least far moreso by leaps and bounds than Iraq which makes the given scenario seem even moreso a result of mismanagement than factors endogenous to the conflict itself.
Here’s what I see happening: we’re already pulling a play of out the Bush administration’s playbook and continually redefining victory, moving the mark increasingly closer to the abysmal status quo. Ultimately, then, we’ll declare however nominal a victory allowable for an exit stage left. Obama recently commented that our goal was to prevent al-Qaeda from carrying out any attacks based from Afghanistan. He recently said that this would mean preventing Taliban re-empowerment. This, factor, however, will disappear from his speeches as we grow increasingly wary of our lack of success (because we ultimately will not send the threshold force to make any real gains). This has been scaled back dramatically from what was our initial stated intention to develop the Afghan state.
And if he did really mean prevent Taliban re-empowerment, does he mean indefinitely? I think not. Any president’s calculations are almost always limited to the short term (the length of their remaining time in office). Proof: the Bush administration could not have possible thought that the “gains” derived from segregation of Iraq that we simplistically attributed to “the surge” would prevent civil war in the long term. Remember “the surge is working/the surge worked?” As we’ve already begun to see on a relatively large scale, the new framework in Iraq is significant danger of effectively being subverted barely a couple weeks after the cessation of “combat operations” by American forces without the express request of Iraqi government.
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Iraqi Foreign Ministry, Post-America - 08/20
During the Abassid Empire, Baghdad was Madinat as-Salam, or City of Peace. The march of time as progress, indeed.
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Insofar as al-Qaeda has no base of operation in Afghanistan, MISSION ACCOMPLISHED! They all moved to Pakistan so now it’s someone else’s problem.
We won’t pay off the numbers of would-be defectors necessary and the Taliban leadership who exist in cozy ideological proximity to al Qaeda will not negotiate within a climate in which they are prevailing (which is this year’s weather report). If Obama pays off Taliban (“terrorists”) he will slip further into the abyss of being the vilified Muslim that (the bigoted cross-section of) conservative America painted him as during campaign season. Further, the Israel and Jewish lobbies which wield considerable clout in American politics may revoke their vote as they see this move strategically dangerous to their geopolitical situation in the Middle East and this presidency making our “special relationship” far less special through this action and other more important ones.
My Inner Critical Theorist Hates Me
I’d love to believe that problems like these have executable solutions. The basic tenet of critical theory in political science is that we study these things so that we can fix them. Realists believe it’s good to study these problems in themselves – and from their conclusions, perhaps someone will make an informed decision. Given the framework that I will neglect to define or for which I will not provide parameters (suffice it to say self-interestedness, competition in an anarchic international system [one lacking an enforcing authority], and democracy) – we have an abysmal track record of making significant headway in nation-building missions.
Part of the reason remains that our early attempts to effect foreign governments was pervaded by coercive means through which we used our intelligence agencies to subvert states. In the early 1950’s we overthrew Mossadeq (see: A Brief History of Hating America) in Iran and imposed the Shah. He was deposed by the 1973 Revolution. That worked well for us, right? In 1961, we attempted to out Castro in the Bay of Pig invasion. It drove him further to the left and solidified his popularity. Much good that did. Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, etc. There aren’t a shortage of examples where our policies have yielded the reverse of the desired effect.
The modern paradigm seemed to manifest only recently. Though many point to the Marshall Plan, this is a weak likeness – riddled with incompatibilities to development scenarios in Africa, the Middle East, and the underdeveloped South as a whole.
Needless to say, 1.) we suck at it and 2.) aren’t serious about it – so it won’t happen. Given that, nothing short of it will transform Afghanistan to the necessary extent BUT it.
To recap:
If and only if:
we can develop an effective Afghan state
then:
we will win.
Since:
we won’t and cannot develop an effective Afghan state
then:
we will lose.
Even if we relax our definition of victory, these lack any substantive meaning (especially relative to the initially conceived goals of grandiose proportion) and therefore, by practical normative standards, we still lose – like in Iraq.
Even sending more troops won’t help because we STILL won’t send the necessary troops. It remains a tall order that Afghan troops can support a large enough security apparatus of their own. What it would take would total something like 3X Afghanistan’s GDP to fund a force to thwart the Taliban.
In this respect, defensive realists seem to hit the mark by holding that more often than not, it is in our interests to do little unless directly provoked. Saddam Hussein, however, evil – did a far superior job at creating a security environment and governable space within Iraq that we have – a further – within the scope of a War on Terrorism, in even the loosest of interpretations, America created al Qaeda in Iraq upon our arrival there. Even if he had WMD’s – which he did not – he was highly concerned with maintaining power in Iraq, and therefore, by all rational accounts, was a deterrable threat to American interests.
What Border?
If you were on Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan, like in most areas of the world’s border regions, you’d have no idea. Just ask every unsuspecting journalist captured by unfriendly states within the last twenty years.
We’ve been in Afghanistan far too close to a decade for having accomplished as little as we have in relation to our initially stated goals. Their state remains ranked among the poorest, most corrupt, least free in the world. Having driven our true enemies into another state in which we have no real war effort, minus drone attacks and suspicious allies in Pakistan’s military apparatus, government, and ISI, there’s no guarantee that the nearly $200 b tab or 750 American deaths (1300 or so, coalition) has made even the most nominal impact on our security situation here at home. Some intelligence estimates show us less safe.
The modern Westphalian state which the West imposed upon the rest, as if by some divine irony is preventing us from killing the people that we need to die. All the nuance contained by the world cannot make this more implicit – al Qaeda stands as an undeterrable foe.
Believe It Or Not…
All this could be much much worse.
On a side note, in what I believe would have been the outset of WWIII, former VP Dick Cheney has recently publicized that he advocated a military incursion into Iran but former President George Bush expressly denied him. This, if nothing else, is George Bush’s saving grace. Albeit we may at some point find it necessary to go to war with Iran (if they make some fatal calculation against Israel, for instance) though their state stands willing to talk to us now.
He told the Wall Street Journal
I was probably a bigger advocate of military action than any of my colleagues… I thought that negotiations could not possibly succeed unless the Iranians really believed we were prepared to use military force.
How are these 2 ideas even reconcilable with one another? Thank your luck stars that Bush had sense enough to deny this bit of advice. Perhaps it was the Israel lobby? We’re preparing to hold talks without having waged another war. Choosing military inaction was better than risking more mismanagement for the same result we’ve apparently achieved.
What’s more, John McCain joked on the campaign trail that he would
Bomb Bomb Bomb – Bomb Bomb Iran.
Good job, America!
We couldn’t properly manage 2 – three would have been suicidal on a couple important levels (particularly the energy one). Granted, if the war proceeded as the “decisive victory” it was supposed to, who knows what would have happened?
Also, insofar as Iran stands as a foremost breeding ground for insurgent factions (I propose we’ve been waging, at least in part, several proxy wars), this would have been a game-changing mistake. The tides of liberalism are already working in our favor there and we would have simply solidified the grasp of the revolutionary regime upon consummating this error.
We learned 2 days ago, for instance, that they have breakout nuclear capability and have stalled in completing the final steps to weaponize their uranium stores.
Now they want to talk. Clearly, given the burden of sanctions which has weakened their economic capacity – which in tern, effects life for the citizenry – which places pressure on reformist sentiment – I suspect that they’ve wanted to hold negotiations all along. Their breakout capability simply gives them a strengthened place at the bargaining table by which they can hopefully return economic growth and re-solidify power, ensuring the short-term longevity of Islamic Revolution of 1973.
Doctors and aid workers are wrestling with proving that they are not illegally transporting children, whose risk of dying is rising while the paperwork awaits.
Posted by christopherwalker 
